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Abstract: The regulations of the European Union (EU) Council in 2004 are the basis
of the deployment of electronic passports within the EU. Since then EU member states
adopt the format and the access protocols to further electronic machine readable travel
documents (eMRTD) like national electronic ID cards and electronic residence per-
mits, respectively. The security protocols to communicate with an eMRTD are based
on the paradigm of strong cohesion and loose coupling, i.e., each step is designed
to ensure only a particular security goal like authorisation to access a certain data
group, authenticity and integrity of the data, originality of the chip, or the linkage be-
tween the eMRTD and its holder. However, recently a discussion evolved to integrate
the linkage security goal within the connection establishment, which currently only
aims at limiting basic access of authorised terminals to the eMRTD. For instance, the
BioPACE protocol proposes to replace the knowledge-based shared ’secret’ of PACE
by a biometric-based one. The goal of the paper at hand is twofold: First, we evalu-
ate the BioPACE protocol and propose improvements to enhance its features. Second,
we analyse the expediency of integrating our BioPACE version 2 into the eMRTD do-
main. Our initial evaluation shows that our BioPACE version 2 is expedient if the EAC
protocols and the corresponding PKI are abandoned.
1 Introduction
Since 2004 EU member states issue ePassports, which feature an embedded radio fre-
quency (RF) chip [EU04, EU05]. This chip contains sensitive biometric data, typically in-
cluding the ePassport holder’s facial image and fingerprints of two index fingers [ICA06].
In order to address the risks that arise through the electronic storage and wireless commu-
nication channel, security protocols for ePassports have been specified [ICA06, BSI10].
The privacy of ePassport holders, for example, is protected by access control mechanisms,
which ensure that only trusted parties may read the fingerprints. Confidentiality of the
transferred data is achieved by encrypting all communication between an inspection sys-
tem and the chip. The specified protocols also ensure authenticity and integrity of the data
read from the chip, as well as the originality of the chip itself.
The specified security protocols follow the paradigm of strong cohesion and loose cou-
pling. That is, each protocol fulfils a very specific security goal and the security protocols
hardly depend on each other, if there is a dependency at all. This paradigm is well estab-
lished in the software engineering community [IEE90, ISO05].
Due to this principle further chip equipped cards (e.g., electronic ID cards) with similar
security goals can use a subset of the ePassports’ security protocols and replace an ePass-
port protocol by a new one where appropriate. This does not only create a benefit for the
electronic ID cards, but instead a mutual gain, because if a new improved security protocol
is favoured in the electronic ID card domain it might replace the ePassport counterpart in
the long term. This is currently the case for the Password Authenticated Connection Estab-
lishment (PACE, [BSI10]), which is expected to replace the Basic Access Control (BAC)
protocol by the PACE-based Supplemental Access Control (SAC) in 2018 [ICA13].
Recently Deufel et al. [DMDK13] propose the BioPACE protocol as a replacement for the
knowledge-based shared ’secret’ of PACE. The BioPACE protocol uses a biometric-based
secret instead.
The goal of our paper is twofold: Firstly, we evaluate the BioPACE protocol. We document
weaknesses compared to PACE, especially that BioPACE enables tracking and abandons
the connection of the physical document and its chip. Additionally we propose improve-
ments to enhance its features. Secondly, we analyse the expediency of integrating our
BioPACE version 2 into the eMRTD domain. We sketch the idea of replacing the expen-
sive Extended Access Control (EAC) protocols and its related Country Verifying Public
Key Infrastructure (CV PKI) by our BioPACE version 2 protocol. An initial evaluation
reveals that our BioPACE version 2 actually has the potential to serve as replacement,
if some of the conveniences of EAC are considered to be dispensable (e.g., fine-grained
authorisation levels to different data groups).
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the security protocols, which are
relevant for the later discussion of BioPACE. In Section 3 the concept and underlying idea
of BioPACE is introduced. The security assessment of BioPACE is presented in Section 4.
Section 5 proposes an enhanced version of BioPACE. Section 6 presents future plans to
replace EAC with our BioPACE version 2, and discusses the expediency of our BioPACE
version 2 in the eMRTD domain. In Section 7 conclusions are drawn and the presented
improvements and the usefulness of BioPACE are discussed.
2 eMRTD protocols and their security goals
This section describes the eMRTD protocols and their security goals. Each protocol fulfils
a very specific security goal. The protocols are either specified by the International Civil
Aviation Organisation (ICAO) [ICA06] or the German Federal Office for Information Se-
curity (BSI) [BSI10], and are well described in [KN07].
Passive Authentication is the only protocol, which is specified as mandatory by the ICAO
[ICA06]. It provides authenticity and integrity of the data stored on the chip. Passive
Authentication depends on the so-called Signing PKI.
Basic Access Control (BAC) provides protection against unauthorised access to the data
stored on the chip [ICA06]. Unauthorised means access to the data without the eMRTD
owner handing over the document. To get access to the chip the terminal needs optical
access to the data page to read the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ). The terminal authenti-
cates itself to the chip with the data read from the MRZ, and both entities agree on session
keys during BAC to establish a secure channel which provides authenticity, integrity and
confidentiality of the transferred data by means of the Secure Messaging sub-protocol.
To protect the sensitive data groups BAC is not sufficient. Therefore Extended Access
Control (EAC) protects data group 3 (DG3), which contains the fingerprints. EAC consists
of Terminal Authentication and Chip Authentication [BSI10]. After performing EAC the
terminal can read the fingerprints, capture a biometric sample from the eMRTD holder and
compare the biometric data to check if the current eMRTD holder is the legitimate owner,
and thereby achieves the linkage security goal.
To prevent chip cloning, two protocols exist in the eMRTD domain. Active Authentication
(AA) specified by the ICAO [ICA06] and as part of EAC Chip Authentication (CA) spec-
ified by the BSI [BSI10]. Both protocols prove the authenticity of the chip (originality)
to the terminal. AA achieves this goal with a challenge-response protocol and CA estab-
lishes a strong secure channel based on the Diffie-Hellman protocol to implicitly prove the
originality of the chip.
Terminal Authentication (TA) is part of EAC and is a protocol by which a terminal can
prove to a chip its access right to the sensitive biometric data [BSI10]. The chip forces
every terminal to prove its authorisation to DG3 before granting access to the fingerprints.
TA is based on a PKI for terminals called the Country Verifying PKI.
The Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) fulfils the same security
goals as BAC, but provides strong session keys even in the presence of low-entropy pass-
words, and contrary to BAC is resistant against offline brute-force attacks [BSI10]. The
shared password is denoted by pi and can either be received from the MRZ, a PIN, or the
Card Access Number (CAN), which is printed on the data page of the eMRTD and con-
sists of a six digit number. PACE is based on symmetric and asymmetric cryptography,
while BAC is based solely on symmetric cryptography. PACE is depicted in Figure 1 and
roughly consists of the following steps:
• First the eMRTD chip randomly chooses a nonce s and encrypts it withKpi which is
derived from the shared password pi. The chips sends the ciphertext z = EncKpi (s)
to the terminal.
• The terminal recovers s with the shared password pi and receives s = DecKpi (z).
• Chip and terminal both create ephemeral key pairs, and perform a Diffie-Hellman
key agreement protocol based on these key pairs and the generated shared secret s.
By performing Diffie-Hellman both entities agree on a new shared secretK.
• Based onK both parties derive session keys.
• Chip and terminal exchange and verify authentication tokens based on a Message
Authentication Code.
• After successfully performing PACE the Secure Messaging sub-protocol is started
with the derived session keys to establish a secure channel, which provides authen-
ticity, integrity and confidentiality.
Terminal eMRTD
randomly choose s and encrypt
z = EncKpi (s)
z
decrypt s = DecKpi (z)
choose ˜keypair1 based on s choose ˜keypair2 based on s
derive K: Diffie-Hellman(key pairs, s)
derive session keys based on K derive session keys based on K
exchange authentication tokens
verify token verify token
secure channel
Figure 1: The PACE protocol
PACE is the basic building block for the BioPACE protocol introduced in the next section.
3 BioPACE
This section presents the BioPACE security protocol and its underlying idea as introduced
by Deufel et al. in [DMDK13]. Deufel et al. present BioPACE as a pre-processing step to
the PACE protocol, which we describe in Section 2. We first sketch the idea of BioPACE
and then describe its two phases.
The underlying idea for the pre-processing step is to make use of biometric template
protection based on the ISO/IEC 24745 standard for biometric information protection
[ISO11]. BioPACE does not favour a biometric modality, i.e., BioPACE may be im-
plemented using the facial image, fingerprints, iris, etc. During personalisation of an
eMRTD the biometric modality is enrolled and a feature extraction from the captured
biometric sample results in a biometric reference comprising of a pseudonymous identi-
fier PI and auxiliary data AD. The concrete specification of PI and AD with respect to
size and structure is neither specified by the ISO/IEC 24745 standard nor by the authors
of [DMDK13]. A verification consists of a new feature extraction from a fresh biometric
sample and the previously enrolled AD. The verification results in a new pseudonymous
identifier PI∗, which equals PI if and only if the same person provided the biometric
sample and therefore a biometric match occurs.
We now explain the two phases of BioPACE in more detail. The authors of [DMDK13]
call these phases the initialisation phase and the regular use phase.
eMRTD owner Terminal eMRTD
read DG13
(AD, ENCPI(CAN))
measure biometric probe
Use AD to calculate PI∗
CAN∗ := DECPI∗ (ENCPI (CAN))
PACE (CAN∗)
secure channel
Figure 2: The BioPACE protocol
During the initialisation phase the biometric enrolment is conducted, which results in PI
and AD. Additionally the eMRTD chip or a backend system creates a random CAN or
PIN, which serve as input for the regular PACE protocol after the pre-processing step
of BioPACE. In what follows we denote this random secret as CAN. The secret CAN
is encrypted using PI as encryption key resulting in ENCPI(CAN). Then PI is dis-
carded. The pair (AD,ENCPI(CAN)) is then written to data group 13 (DG13) of
the eMRTD logical data structure (LDS) [ICA06]. DG13 is publicly accessible without
any authentication. This is justified by [DMDK13] with the consideration that the tuple
(AD,ENCPI(CAN)) is not security sensitive, because it does not disclose biometric
data of the enrolled person.
After the initialisation phase BioPACE is ready for regular use. This phase is depicted in
Figure 2. If an inspection system wants to perform BioPACE, it first has to read DG13
to receive (AD,ENCPI(CAN)). The inspection system captures a biometric sample
from the document holder and uses the received AD from DG13 to compute PI∗. The
inspection system then performs DECPI∗(ENCPI(CAN)) to decrypt ENCPI(CAN)
using PI∗ as decryption key to receive CAN∗, which will match CAN if and only if PI∗
matches PI .
The secret value CAN is also known to the eMRTD chip, because it is stored in its internal
memory and can therefore be used as input for the standard PACE protocol. After this
pre-processing step BioPACE uses the steps of the PACE protocol, which we explain in
Section 2.
4 Assessment of BioPACE
In this section we present our security assessment of BioPACE with respect to common
security features of an eMRTD. We identified weaknesses that are introduced when re-
placing PACE with BioPACE. Every paragraph first presents a short assessment regarding
a specific security aspect, and then proposes possible solutions, when applicable.
No physical to electronic linkage. Where PACE makes a link between the printed data
page of the eMRTD and the chip inside the eMRTD, BioPACE makes a link between
the eMRTD owner and the chip inside the eMRTD. There is no link anymore between
the printed data page of the eMRTD and the chip inside the eMRTD. As a consequence
it cannot build further upon the prior established authenticity of the MRZ and CAN (by
checking the optical security features on eMRTDs, such as special paper and printing
techniques).
Tracking. While PACE guarantees the unlinkability of eMRTD occurrences on the wire-
less channel, BioPACE does not. The authors of BioPACE justify that data group 13 can
be read freely from the chip by claiming that it does not disclose any biometric data and
as such is not security-sensitive. However, the data (AD,ENCPI(CAN)) provides a
unique identifier for every eMRTD and can be read out by anyone within communication
range of the eMRTD making tracking possible.
A possible solution would be to print (AD,ENCPI(CAN)) on the data page of the
eMRTD, additionally ensuring the coupling between the data page of the eMRTD and
the chip. However, this would require substantial changes in the eMRTD creation and
verification processes, as opposed to reading out some extra values from the chip.
Usability degradation. The aspect of better comfort is not proven in the paper. We
doubt that reading and processing a fingerprint is faster than performing OCR on a MRZ
or CAN. Implementing BioPACE instead of PACE also means that the verifier needs bio-
metric reader equipment, even if one only wants to read the chip’s version of the holder’s
name, or to verify authenticity and integrity of the chip’s data via passive authentica-
tion. At the end of the paper, it is suggested that one can always skip the biometric pre-
processing step of BioPACE and fall back to the original PACE. However, if the biometric
pre-processing step can be skipped, this raises questions about the benefits of BioPACE,
especially towards the eMRTD owner.
Loss of access control flexibility. As long as the sensitive biometric fingerprints are
stored on the chip BioPACE should not be considered as EU EAC replacement, because it
can only provide two possible authorisation levels: read every data group or read no data
group. With EAC, one can provide a more fine grained access control and the eMRTD
receives an explicit authorisation from its issuing country that this terminal is indeed au-
thorised to read certain data groups.
A possible solution is to replace the raw fingerprints by a biometric template that leaks no
sensitive information.
Double biometric linkage goal. The basic BioPACE protocol claims to provide access
control and create a link between the eMRTD holder and the chip. In the current eMRTD
security protocol pool these goals are already achieved by BAC, PACE and EAC for the
access control and the fingerprints stored on the chip for the biometric link. Achieving
the same security goal twice has no benefit and only makes the border control check more
lengthy.
Removing EAC and the raw fingerprints would justify the access control and linkage goal
of BioPACE. Of course this should only be considered if the eMRTD would contain no
more sensitive biometric data.
Skimming. BioPACE claims that no unauthorised data retrieval is possible. For eM-
RTDs that implement PACE, one requires access to the printed data page of the eMRTD
to read the data on the chip. Handing the eMRTD over to an official for checking can be
seen as an implicit authorisation from the eMRTD owner. For BioPACE to reach the same
level of authorisation, eMRTD holders can only provide their fingerprint to the officials
checking their eMRTDs. However, we leave our fingerprints everywhere. Anyone within
wireless communication range that has access to the fingerprint of the eMRTD holder, can
read out the data of the eMRTD without the owner even being aware. This makes skim-
ming attacks easy, for example in airport bars (given that one can extract the fingerprint
from a glass in a timely manner). One does not need to fool the terminal’s fingerprint
reader (which is hard, since one has to make a dummy finger, possible liveness detection)
but the raw image data is good enough for direct processing. As boundary condition, the
attacker also needs a terminal and the attack is only justified if a name or facial image to a
corresponding fingerprint is the goal of the attacker.
By making a link to the printed data page of the eMRTD this attack can be mitigated,
because the printed content is not revealed in airport bars.
Offline eMRTD owner guessing. Because the CAN has low entropy, an offline guess-
ing attack with respect to whom the eMRTD belongs to is possible. Assume that one
wants to track a number of high profile individuals and one has access to their fingerprints
(which are left behind on whatever the person in question happens to touch). From these
fingerprints, together with AD one can derive all possible PI’s. Only a subset of the
corresponding ENCPI(CAN) will decrypt to a possible CAN (having low entropy). Of
course this will not uniquely identify any one person, but it will narrow down the search
space significantly.
A trivial solution would be to pad the CAN with some randomness before encryption, and
discard the padding upon decryption. Note that this would not work, when using the MRZ
instead of the CAN. While the MRZ has typically more entropy than the CAN, it also has
more structure that is preserved regardless of the random padding.
A side note worth mentioning: If PI could provide a high enough entropy it could also
make BAC attractive again, because the main complaint of BAC is the low entropy of the
MRZ combined with its vulnerability to offline brute-force attacks. Still PACE is resistant
against offline brute-force attacks and should therefore preferred over BAC.
5 An improved BioPACE: BioPACE version 2
This section formalises our BioPACE version 2 protocol. It aims at fixing the flaws iden-
tified in Section 4 by changing BioPACE according to the proposals of Section 4.
Figure 3 on the next page illustrates the protocol steps of our BioPACE version 2 protocol.
The improvement consists of two main changes compared to the basic version: First, PI∗
is used directly as input for the PACE protocol (and not as decryption key to get the low
entropy CAN). Second, AD is printed on the data page of the eMRTD to link the physical
document to the chip instead of storing AD on the chip.
eMRTD owner Terminal printed eMRTD
read 2D barcode
AD
measure biometric probe
Use AD to calculate PI∗
eMRTD
PACE (PI∗)
secure channel
Figure 3: Our BioPACE version 2 protocol
We see no reason why one should encrypt a low entropy value (CAN or MRZ) if it does
not need to be transferred manually/optically. Therefore, we use PI∗ directly as input for
the PACE protocol. This also means that the value ENCPI(CAN) no longer needs to be
transmitted from the eMRTD to the terminal via the wireless channel. Hence there is no
initial access from the terminal to DG13 of the eMRTD. By removing the initial wireless
access we avoid the issue of offline guessing of the eMRTD owner, too.
AD is printed on the data page of the eMRTD in form of a 2D barcode (e.g., a QR code
[ISO06b] or a Data Matrix code [ISO06a]), which is shown in Figure 4 on the following
page. PI is not publicly available, instead it is stored in the internal memory of the eMRTD
chip and therefore only available to the chip itself, but not to the terminal. Since the chip
does not need to transmit (AD,ENCPI(CAN)), there is no longer a unique identifier for
the eMRTD, resolving the tracking problem.
We decided against integrating AD into the present MRZ, because in our experience a
2D barcode is more reliable due to the integrated error correction code and more flexible
for an AD with variable size depending on the selected biometric modality. 2D barcodes
become more and more popular in different areas of document security.
For instance, there is currently a discussion in the EU to integrate 2D barcodes to enhance
the authenticity and integrity of non-electronic travel and ID documents (e.g., birth certifi-
cates, emergency passports, visas and driver licenses). This EU discussion is based on a
new national standard, which is called the Digital Seal [BSI13].
By printing AD on the data page we recreate the link between the physical eMRTD and
the chip. Now a terminal needs optical access to the eMRTD to scan the 2D barcode and
receiveAD to calculate PI∗. This will provide at least the same level of protection against
skimming and sniffing attacks as PACE.
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Figure 4: The eMRTD data page with AD printed as data matrix code
In the basic BioPACE protocol, matching PI to PI∗ is done implicitly by decrypting
the low-entropy CAN with PI∗ and initialising PACE with the resulting CAN∗. The
key space entropy of PI is not specified by [DMDK13], but we consider it higher than
the entropy of a numeric six digit CAN with an entropy of at most 20 bits. Therefore
we directly enter PI∗ into PACE. Besides the higher entropy benefit, PI∗ is implicitly
matched to PI by the completion of the PACE protocol, because if PI∗ and PI do not
match the PACE protocol will fail.
Our BioPACE version 2 fixes all the mentioned security problems of Section 4. Now, it
fulfils its duty as an access control mechanism and leaks no more unambiguous linkable
data before the protocol successfully completes. To track a person and to read the data on
the chip the attacker needs optical access to the data page. This equals the current security
level of eMRTDs and does not constitute a security risk, because if an attacker gets access
to the data page he can read all data in printed form anyway.
Still some problems remain and therefore we will discuss the expediency of our BioPACE
version 2 in the eMRTD domain in the subsequent section.
6 Replacing EAC and raw fingerprints by BioPACE version 2
In this section we discuss our idea to replace the current infrastructure (i.e., the EAC
protocols, the Country Verifying PKI, and the storage of raw fingerprints in data group 3)
by our BioPACE version 2 protocol. We contrast the advantages with the disadvantages
of our approach and include boundary conditions, which have to be fulfilled to make our
BioPACE version 2 expedient.
Fundamental changes to an established infrastructure are a challenging task and require as
a boundary condition both innovative ideas and enhanced security. We consider BioPACE
version 2 to meet these demands as discussed below. In our context, for instance, a sample
innovative idea is the Biocryptographic Key Infrastructure [SBB10] to replace a common
Public Key Infrastructure, yielding a higher security level. An example of enhancing an
applied and proven protocol is the Biotokens [SB08] example, where biometric digital
signatures and Bio-Kerberos increases security. Therefore the redundant protocols have
to be dropped, and the BioPACE version 2 has to provide a significant enhancement to
become a new eMRTD standard.
If BioPACE version 2 is used without a subsequent EAC accomplishment, we see the
following benefits:
1. Faster verification: If we drop EAC and make use of a PI instead of raw fin-
gerprints, we eliminate two bottlenecks: first, no more raw fingerprints have to be
transferred from the chip to the terminal over the wireless interface. Second the
lack of terminal authentication resolves the need to verify certificate chains by the
eMRTD chip. This will drastically speed up the eMRTD processing times at border
checks.
2. Enhanced practical security: According to a recent EU border control study [Com,
D4.1] border control personnel does only perform an electronic check against eMRTD
blacklists due to time constraints. Hence in practice the actual security level of the
eMRTD chip and its infrastructure is mainly not used. A significant speed-up of
the verification protocols will therefore not only make the verification more conve-
nient for the travellers, but it will improve security, because the electronic security
features will be actually used by border control personnel even under strict time
schedule guidelines.
3. Improving privacy: Raw fingerprints are removed and replaced with a biometric
template, which is stored in the eMRTD’s internal memory and therefore only ac-
cessible by the chip. Hence the privacy level is improved.
4. Decreasing infrastructure costs: If we abandon terminal authentication, there is
no more need to maintain the complicated Country Verifying PKI. As the further
expenses remain constant (e.g., the costs for the biometric personalisation of eM-
RTDs), the costs of the whole eMRTD infrastructure will decrease significantly.
5. Standardised data structures: 2D barcodes are standardised, and their integration
is already discussed for non-electronic travel documents based on the Digital Seal
standard [BSI13, Com, D6.1].
On the other hand BioPACE version 2 as a replacement for EAC yields the following
downsides:
1. Change of layout: To establish the BioPACE version 2 protocol in the eMRTD
domain the creation and enrolment process has to be changed, because AD needs to
be printed on the data page.
2. Coarse-grained access control: As discussed in Section 4 BioPACE version 2
causes a loss of access control flexibility. However, if the sensitive JPEG finger-
prints are removed from the chip no more sensitive data remains, which is worth
protection with a flexible access control scheme.
3. Renounce of strong cohesion paradigm: Security protocols often follow the soft-
ware engineering paradigm of strong cohesion and loose coupling. Every protocol
should have a very specific goal and depend on as few as possible other protocols.
Our proposal abandons this paradigm.
4. Chip cloning: Dropping EAC results in the loss of chip authentication and hence
in giving up the current chip cloning protection. However, the physical protection
through the printed AD on the document makes chip cloning useless from a practical
point of view. We discuss a further electronic prevention approach of chip cloning
below.
To conclude we rate the improvement with respect to run-time, practical security, and
costs to be more important than the disadvantages to change the layout and the loss of
fine-grained access control.
Future attention should be paid to a sample specification of the PI scheme and to the
integration of a chip cloning protection into the BioPACE version 2 protocol. Bender et
al. [BDFK12] present a protocol called PACE|AA, which combines PACE and Active
Authentication to create a protocol, which is more efficient than the single protocols and
solves a security risk of Active Authentication.
7 Conclusion and future work
This paper presented an assessment of the BioPACE protocol, pointed out flaws in the
basic version and proposed an optimised version which fixed these flaws. The second part
of this paper analysed the expediency of the BioPACE version 2 protocol and came to
the conclusion that it is not expedient in its proposed form. The final section presented a
drastic approach which makes our BioPACE version 2 very attractive if the EAC protocols
together with the expensive CV PKI are shut down and our BioPACE version 2 gets merged
with the PACE|AA protocol to also get a chip cloning protection and become a perfectly
tailored monolithic security protocol for the eMRTD domains requirements.
We presented the theoretical idea of merging our BioPACE version 2 protocol with the
PACE|AA protocol, therefore future work will focus on a formal security proof for this
protocol based on the model proposed by Bellare et al.[BPR00].
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